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Comparative Corporate Governance – A Global Research Seminar 
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The Manner in which corporate law and financial regulations are made 
 
A. Introduction 
Substantial differences exist in the systems of corporate law from an international per-
spective. There are different approaches concerning the law-making. Starting from possible rea-
sons for the differences, this paper shall serve as a comparative analysis of the manner in which 
corporate law is made in Germany as well as in the United States. In the light of the topic of this 
seminar the focus of this paper will lay on corporate governance. 
After a detailed representation of the law-making analysis in Germany, followed by that 
of the United States, the third part will consist of a comparative analysis of both systems. For 
analyzing the possible reasons for the differences in both jurisdictions, connections of legal histo-
ry, legal theories and other backgrounds, as well as the roles of the different institutions and 
guidelines are included. In the context of legal harmonization, the third part will also offer a de-
termination of attempts for harmonizing the legal systems as well as a possible prospect for fu-
ture developments and endeavors. 
B. The manner in which corporate law is made in Germany 
  In the course of the history until now German corporate law and the manner in which it 
was made often changed and constantly developed. Like no other legal field, the development of 
German jurisdiction can be illustrated by German corporate law, considering historical, political 
and social aspects. For this reason, in order to classify and compare German corporate law, this 
first part of the paper contains an analysis of German corporate law, starting in its very begin-
nings and coming to its most current expression, being the subject of corporate governance, while 
passing all relevant steps in between. Reaching today’s time Corporate Governance shall be clas-
sified and analyzed in the light of globalization, Europeanisation, new challenges and influences. 
In all those parts, special attention shall be given to the legal form and nature of corporate law. 
Having set the scene of German corporate law, German corporate governance and the German 
Corporate Governance code shall be classified, analyzed and legally classified in a national and 
international context.  
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I. An introduction to German corporate law 
  One common definition of German corporate law states that corporate law covers the law 
of associations under private law
1
 which are established for the purpose of reaching a certain 
common goal through legal transaction.
2
 In the course of the time this definition became decep-
tive and questioned since companies with a sole shareholder are not associations but are, never-
theless, subjected to corporate law under certain circumstances.
3
 However, other definitions have 
not been able to fully establish themselves. 
  Subject of German corporate law are various legal forms, which are ruled in different 
laws. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereafter referred to as “BGB”)
4
 holds 
provisions for the basic forms of associations (Vereine, section 21 et seqq. of the BGB) and cor-
porations (Gesellschaften, section 705 et seqq. of the BGB). Further, the German Commercial 
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, hereafter referred to as “HGB”)
5
 contains rules for partnerships (of-
fene Handelsgesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “OHG”; section 105 et seqq. of the HGB), 
limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “KG”; section 161 et 
seqq. of the HGB) and other legal forms
6
 which are less relevant in this context.  
  Those legal forms of great practical importance are ruled by own laws which are exclu-
sively created for the particular legal form. The most important ones for these are the Stock Cor-
poration Act of 1965 (Aktiengesetz, hereafter referred to as “AktG”)
7
, providing laws for stock 
companies (Aktiengesellschaften, hereafter referred to as “AG”), as well as the Act on Limited 
Liability Companies (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, hereafter 
referred to as “GmbHG”)
8
, containing the relevant laws for Limited Liability Companies (Gesell-
schaften mit beschränkter Haftung, hereafter referred to as “GmbH”). This division, which is 
common for European legislations, does not refer to the size of the company.
9
 However, only 
shares of a stock corporation can be listed and traded on the stock market.
10
 For this reason stock 
                                                     
1
 Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 II 1a). 
2
 Grunewald, 1-2; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 I; Klunzinger, Grundzüge des Gesellschaftsrechts, § 1 II. 
3
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 1 II 1.  
4
 German Civil code as of 18 August 1896 (RGBl. I p. 195). 
5
 German Commercial Code as of 10 May 1897 (RGBl. I p. 219). 
6
 E.g. silent partnerships (stille Gesellschaften, section 230 et seq of the HGB) and shipping companies (Reedereien, 
section 489 et seq of the HGB). 
7
 Stock Corporation Act as of 6 September 1965 (BGBl. I p. 1089). 
8
 Act on Limited Liability Companies as of 20 April 1892 (RGBl. I p. 477). 
9
 Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, 242; Baums/Birkenkaemper, CG, I. 
10
 Mäntysaari, Comparative Corporate Governance, 242. 
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corporations is rather the legal form to choose for large, publicly held firms with widely distrib-
uted ownership.
11
 
II. Historical development of German corporate law 
The historical foundations and roots of German corporate law are not only academically 
of interest, but also provide a better understanding for today’s corporate law in Germany as well 
as legal comparisons and the Europeanization of corporate law.
12
 
1. The origins of German corporate law  
  The manner in which today’s corporate law is made is a product of the past two centuries 
even though certain elements have their origin much earlier.
13
 Corporate law, as nearly all Ger-
man laws, has been subject to wide array of influences from Roman law.
14
 However, even if cer-
tain structures resemble some of todays legal forms of corporations, there is an important struc-
tural difference being that all former expressions of legal forms of corporations were integrated in 
a corporate-estates based social order which was concededly stable but far from flexible.
15
  
2. Corporate law in the time of German liberalism 
  The birth of modern corporate law in Germany was the transition from a corporate-
estates-based to a civil-liberal social order.
16
 The reorganization of the community order as well 
as the incorporation of principles such as private autonomy, private property and freedom of trade 
marked the end of the feudal system making every citizen a potential entrepreneur whose eco-
nomic expansion should, from then on, only be regulated by the market itself and who should be 
free to choose the legal form of a corporation.
17
 At this time, corporate law was still incorporated 
in codified commercial law
18
 but opened to citizens of all social backgrounds. However, in this 
period of time the old mentality of the estate-based order was still present, with the result that 
German people still had strong conservative aversions towards extensive and liberal codes.
19
 
                                                     
11
 Baums/Birkenkaemper, CG, I. 
12
 Kraushaar, 275; detailed in Donald, 19-22. 
13
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 I 1. 
14
 Cf. Kraushaar, 40; Mousourakis, 267. 
15
 Cf. Winkler, 235; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1.  
16
 Winkler, 234. 
17
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1. 
18
 Public German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch), 1869. 
19
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 II 1.  
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With the General German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch) of 
1861 the first codification as known today was introduced. However, not until the turn of the cen-
tury the  complete codification of corporate law was completed.
20
 With the coming into force of 
the HGB and the BGB the basic structures of legal forms such as the corporation, associations 
and companies were set. 
3. The 20th century: dissociation from codification 
  Detailed codifications shaped the picture of corporate law in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century. Deep social transformations and historical happenings, such as the economic liberalism, 
the resulting industrial revolution, the further resulting decay of the homogenous civil society and 
the simultaneously developed grouping of people in the form of labor unions or the first forms of 
associations, were the reason for many and fast changes of this time’s corporate law.
21
 Another 
product of these happenings was the ongoing nationalization of commercial policies. 
  However, already in the very beginning of the 19
th
 century a movement away from com-
plete codifications was noticeable and indicated the decay of the concept of full codifications.
22
 
More and more frequently, special laws were needed, that would not be incorporated in codes, as 
for example the right of the GmbH. As there were needs of the society for a less complex and a 
better-conditioned regulated corporation,
23
 the GmbHG was introduced in 1892 and captured a 
new legal form without any historic or international example. Another example for the outdated 
idea of extensive codes was the formation of the AktG. The extension of the regulation program 
regarding the AG and its policies led to a duplication of the sections and thereby for the regula-
tions concerning the AG to fall out of the HGB and to the formation of the AktG.
24
 
  However, not only the increased number of special laws led to the changing mentality 
concerning codifications but also an increased number of above- and sub-statutory provisions that 
replaced or stepped beside parliamentary laws.
25
 On the other side, cases in which legal regula-
tions were complemented, modified and suppressed by case law as well as statuary and contract 
                                                     
20
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 3. 
21
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 1, § 2 III 3. 
22
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 3. 
23
 Ulmer, in Ulmer/Habersack/Löbbe, A3; Westermann, in Scholz, introduction para. 43. 
24
 Schäfer/Jahntz, in Bayer/Habersack, 256; cf. Grundei/Zaumseil, in Grundei/Zaumseil, 18-19; cf. Schubert, in 
Schubert/Hommelhoff, 1-4; Habersack, in MüKo AktG, Introduction para. 21. 
25
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4.  
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practices constantly grew.
26
 Especially the influence of further developments of law by judicial 
decisions experienced constant growth in the course of time.
27
 The importance of those develop-
ments depended on the presence and the extent of adaptions by the governing law. 
  An example for this is the stock corporation law. Here, existing provisions are regularly 
adapted to changed circumstances. Furthermore, there is comparatively rare processing in stock 
corporation law, wherefore further developments of law by judicial decisions has little meaning.
28
 
In other laws, such as the partnerships only little changes were made since the coming into force 
of the codification. Instead, numerous principles and provisions were formulated by the Imperial 
Court of Justice
29
 as well as the German Federal Supreme Court.
30
  
  In the course of this century, however, much more changed than the outer shape of corpo-
rate law. In prior times corporate law only had limited regulatory content and was mainly about 
the legal relationship between the entrepreneurial company, the investment company and the 
shareholder creditors and therefore mostly represented the interests of those groups. The legisla-
tor trusted in the self-regulation of those interests and provided legal forms to choose from as 
well as nearly unlimited contractual possibilities.
31
 In the following era of single legislations an 
opposite trend can be observed. Much more, corporate law aims at better general organizations of 
corporations and thereby increases the importance of interests of other involved groups turning 
corporate law more and more to mandatory law.
32
 
  These changes of the objective of corporate law – turning away from providing suitable 
organizational structures for private associations, but increasingly to economic and rather distri-
butional objectives – can be very well shown on AktG as of 1965.
33
 The provisions aim im-
provements of different aspects of corporate law such as improved publicity, more transparency 
and more influence of the shareholders organized in the shareholder’s meeting on the profit ap-
propriation. Further, the AktG shall protect investors and savers from bad investments and fraud-
ster. On that point, generally, an increasing orientation of corporate law to concrete economic and 
                                                     
26
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4. 
27
 Detailed in Fischer, 17. 
28
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4c). 
29
 The imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht) was the supreme criminal and civil court oft he German empire from 
1879 to 1945 based in Leipzig, Germany. 
30
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 4c). 
31
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5. 
32
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5. 
33
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5b). 
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sociopolitical purposes can be captured.
34
 
  Germany’s corporate law in the 20
th
 century can be described as a catalogue of regulated 
legal forms, that consisted of the sum of the laws regulating the individual legal forms. At that 
time, problems arose when the existing mandatory law could not provide for the need of regula-
tion with regard to provisions ruling hybrid forms of corporations. This need for provisions that 
captured hybrid and flexible forms of corporation, to this time, indicated a call for impending 
change in the legal appearance of German corporate law. 
4. Corporate law (on its way) in the 21st century  
  A new movement starting from the United States marked a new change in corporate law 
in the 1990s. An extensive deregulation of corporate law led to the displacement or elimination of 
mandatory law by dispositive rules that led to more flexibility and attractiveness for corpora-
tions.
35
  
  In the light of the the ongoing Internationalization of global businesses the rigid corset of 
lengthy legislative processes did not seem to fit into the dynamic, global economy. A faster-
working and more flexible statutory framework was needed,
36
 wherefore the German lawmakers 
were forced to react in order to be competitive.
37
 Therefore, the resulting loosening of the strict 
structures of parts of German Corporate Law can be best explained by the internationally grow-
ing competitive pressure.
38
 Against this background, the significance of law as the central control 
element in a democratic and constitutional state decreased.
39
  
However, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the resulting financial crisis 
the topic of executive compensation was amongst the most controversial topics about time.
40
 The 
fact that the very institutions and individuals that caused the collapse of the economy continue to 
receive extraordinary salaries and benefits seems deeply unfair and the voices grew demanding 
adjusted regulations concerning executive compensation, forcing regulators to react.
41
 While in 
many other countries endeavors were limited or hindered, Germany surprisingly took a leading 
                                                     
34
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 III 5 b). 
35
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 1. 
36
 Möllers/Fekonja, 778 
37
 Cuervo-Cazurra/Aguilera, 430. 
38
 Mathieu, 579, 605; Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 3; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 3. 
39
 Möllers/Fekonja, 779. 
40
 Achleitner/Rapp/Schaller/Wolff, ZCG 2010, pp. 113, 113-115. 
41
 Mathieu, 579, 582. 
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position, taking concrete steps towards systematically changes of the structures of executive 
compensation.
42
 It did so, however, extraordinarily quickly, yet productive and efficient. 
With its Act on the Adequacy of the Management Board’s Compensation 
(Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetz, hereafter referred to as “VorstAG”)
43
 Germany 
encouraged companies to more efficient goal-setting and increased transparency being applicable 
to all tradable stocks.
44
 The enacting of this law significantly contributed to improved corporate 
governance structures and growing attention of shareholders and created a stir. With its VorstAG, 
at the latest, German law making proved its competitiveness and that it is able to adjust to the 
needs and interests of the society in short time. 
III. Europeanization of German corporate law 
Having reached the 21
st
 century, a new level of law-making arose and constantly grew in 
terms of importance. Since the establishment of the European Union legislative approaches of the 
European Commission were actively followed regarding the harmonization of national business 
laws, to become internationally competitive as well as an attractive location for corporations.
45
 
Other factors, such as various national corporate scandals and finally the financial crisis, also 
produced reform efforts towards the Europeanization and harmonization of national business 
laws.
46
 
In this context, the European Court of Justice (Europäischer Gerichtshof, hereafter re-
ferred to as “EuGH”), played an ever growing role in harmonizing and setting the rules for a cor-
porate legal system on European level.
47
 In particular, the jurisdictions of the EuGH concerning 
the freedom of establishment, that no longer allow member states to prohibit or complicate the 
usage of legal forms from jurisdictions of other member states are of relevance.
48
 This matter 
shall be presented in the following, illustrating the scope as well as the significance of the deci-
sions of the EuGH for the member states. 
                                                     
42
 Mathieu, 579, 583. 
43
 Act on the Adequacy of the Management Board’s Compensation as of 31 July 2009 (BGBl. I p. 2509). 
44
 Mathieu, 579, 583. 
45
 Mathieu, 579, 610; cf. Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 3. 
46
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 4; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 1; Armour, ECGI No. 
54/2005, 1. 
47
 Armour, ECGI No. 54/2005, 1. 
48
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 4. 
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1. Daily Mail 
  Starting point of a series of decisions concerning principles of law in the context of free-
dom of establishment was the Daily Mail case
49
 in 1988.
50
 Daily Mail plc, a company registered 
in England, intended to move its tax residence to the Netherlands
51
 due to its more favourable tax 
regimes, while keeping its company subject to British company law. This relocation under Eng-
lish law, required the consent of the British Treasury Department.
52
 The latter, however, refused 
permission for the transfer of seat. Daily Mail argued that this refusal was in conflict with its 
freedom of establishment
53
, referring the question to the EuGH.
54
 Applying a restrictive ap-
proach, the EuGH ruled that companies are “creatures of national law”
55
 and must comply with 
the restrictions of its national law.
56
 Member states, therefore, could preclude national companies 
from transfer their de facto head office.
57
 
2. Centros 
Ten years later the EuGH revisited these ruling in Centros.
58
 A Danish couple established 
Centros Ltd as an offshore company in the UK, in order to avoid the minimum capitalization re-
quirement for Danish limited liability companies.
59
 However, the Danish commercial registry 
refused Centros Ltd to register a branch in Denmark, arguing this to be an unlawful circumven-
tion of the Danish minimum capitalization rules.
60
  
The court held that it is unlawfully to deny a company’s status as a legal person, which 
has been validly conferred by another jurisdiction, just because it has been conferred by another 
jurisdiction.
61
 The court also held that the member states are prohibited from discriminating 
                                                     
49
 Case 81/87, R v HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex p Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 27 
September 1988; hereafter referred to as “Daily Mail“. 
50
 Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 7. 
51
 Daily Mail, para. 6. 
52
 Daily Mail, para. 5, 6; section 482 (1) (a) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. 
53
 Daily Mail referred to its freedom of establishment as ruled in articles 52, 58 of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which is by now overruled by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereafter referred to as “TFEU“). The freedom of establishment as concerned in this context is now governed in 
articles 49, 54 of the TFEU. 
54
 Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 8; Daily Mail, para. 8. 
55
 Daily Mail, para. 19. 
56
 Daily Mail, para. 19. 
57
 Daily Mail, para. 31. 
58
 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 9 March 1999; hereafter referred to as “Centros“. 
59
 Centros, paras. 2, 3, 18. 
60
 Centros, paras. 7, 12, 16.  
61
 Centros, para. 40; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9. 
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against companies on the ground that they were formed under the law of another member state in 
which it has its registered office but does not carry on any business
62
 forcing the Danish authori-
ties to recognize the legal status of Centros Ltd. 
This decision caused a stir. To this time national corporate laws were not harmonized to 
this extent, so that the possibility of an establishment of a company in other member states could 
not be taken for granted. 
3. Überseering 
Not until Überseering
63
 two years later, the significance of this overruling decision be-
came clear, where the EuGH went even further. A limited liability company validly formed under 
Dutch law moved its head office to Dusseldorf, Germany. There, it filed a suit against a debtor 
out of a work contract. However, the German courts refused to recognize the company’s exist-
ence, holding that the corporation did not have legal capacity to sue and be sued under German 
law and dismissing the Dutch company from court proceedings in Germany.
64
 
The EuGH overruled this decision by reference to Centros, after which the company’s sta-
tus as such had been established by Dutch law, wherefore it was entitled to rely on freedom of 
establishment and the other member state is required to recognize the company’s legal capacity. 
4. Inspire Art 
  After Centros, it was recognized, that branches of foreign companies with their head of-
fices in another state must be registered in that other state. Nevertheless, the member states tried 
to equate those companies to their own companies. A law in the Netherlands ruled that their own 
capital financing regulations should as well apply on foreign companies with their head offices in 
the Netherlands.
65
 In this context the EuGH made another fundamental decision.  
  Inspire Art Ltd
66
, a company established under the laws of England and Wales,
67
 request-
ed the registration of the company’s Dutch branch office at the commercial registry in the Nether-
                                                     
62
 Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9. 
63
 Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, 5 November 2002. 
64
 Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 9. 
65
 Art. 4, 6 of the Law on Formally Foreign Companies as of 17 December 1997 (Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse 
Vennootschappen, Staatsblad 1997 No 697, hereafter referred to as “WFBV“). 
66
 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, 30 September 2003; 
hereafter referred to as “Inspire Art”. 
67
 Inspire Art, para. 2, 34. 
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lands.
68
 The registry intended to apply WFBV, containing specific Dutch rules for foreign entities 
registered in the Netherlands. Under this law, Inspire Art Ltd would have been required, to use a 
suffix indicating its foreign origin,
69
 and to comply with the minimum capital rules for Dutch 
limited liability companies.
70
 
  The case ended up before the EuGH which, however, reiterated the points it has made in 
its prior decisions in favor of freedom of establishment.
71
 The court ruled that it is contrary to the 
provisions governing the freedom of establishment for national legislation “impose on the exer-
cise of freedom of secondary establishment in that State by a company formed in accordance with 
the law of another Member State certain conditions provided for in domestic company law in 
respect of company formation relating to minimum capital and directors' liability. The reasons for 
which the company was formed in that other Member State, and the fact that it carries on its ac-
tivities exclusively or almost exclusively in the Member State of establishment, do not deprive it 
of the right to invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the EC Treaty, save where the 
existence of an abuse is established on a case-by-case basis.“
 72
 
5. Range and meaning of the decisions of the EuGH 
  Germany, as most members of the European Union, has traditionally adhered to the “real 
seat” theory, which implies that companies should be governed by the law in which its headquar-
ters is located.
73
 After this theory a company can only chose another member’s corporate law if it 
is willing to move its headquarters, which often outweighs the advantage of the more attractive 
corporate law, in terms of the costs for the relocation.
74
 However, the EuGH overruled the real 
seat theory by applying the “incorporation” theory.
75
 The incorporation theory looks to the law of 
the place of the firm’s incorporation, meaning that entrepreneurs can simply incorporate their 
business in the jurisdiction of their choice and are free to choose the corporate law of their 
choice.
76
 
  With its decisions the EuGH, finally and unambiguously made clear, that the freedom of 
                                                     
68
 Inspire Art, para. 36. 
69
 Inspire Art. Para. 36; Art. 2 WFBV. 
70
 Inspire Art, para. 23; Art. 2-5 WFBV. 
71
 Inspire Art. paras. 91, 94, 98, 120, 135. 
72
 Inspire Art, para. 144.2. 
73
 Dammann, Fordham 2003, 607, 611; Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 6. 
74
 Dammann, Fordham 2003, 607, 611. 
75
 Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI 127/2009, 1 f. 
76
 Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI 127/2009, 2. 
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establishment demands that a corporation that was effectively founded in a member state of the 
European Union should be recognized as such in all other member states in which it settles.
77
  
European entrepreneurs are now free to choose a governing law of their choice among the mem-
ber states,
78
 what practically means that the EuGH overruled member states’ national laws in fa-
vour of European entrepreneurship.
79
 
  The EuGH concretized and confirmed its rulings around the freedom of establishment,
80
 
however, the cases of Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art sufficiently illustrate the scope of the 
increasing importance of the EuGH and the consequences of its overruling for the member states. 
6. Further endeavors towards Europeanization: Societas Europaea 
  Moreover, further steps were taken towards increased harmonization, flexibility and mo-
bility of companies in Europe.
81
 Since October 2004, listed companies have the choice to choose 
not only between competing corporate laws of the member states, but also can choose the law of 
the European Company (Societas Europaea, hereafter referred to as “SE”).
82
 A SE is a legal form 
for a European stock company that is entirely ruled by a standardized law of the European Un-
ion.
83
 
  Legal foundation of a SE is on the one hand the Regulation 2157/2001 of the European 
Council
84
 and the council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001. The SE regulation is both, 
binding law as well as tied into national law with individual national legislation of the member 
states governing how the gaps in the supranational framework are supposed to be filled in.
85
 
Germany  has implemented the directives into their corporate law by way of the European Com-
pany Implementation Act.
86
 
                                                     
77
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 18 I 4d). 
78
 Zimmer, NJW 2003, 3585, 3585, 3587. 
79
 Cf. Armour/Ringe, Oxford LSRP No. 63/2010, 5. 
80
 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc vs Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 12 September 2006; Case C-
210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 16 December 2008. 
81
 Kübler/Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 2 IV 1; Theisen/Wenz, in EG, A II 3. 
82
 Council Regulation of the European commission No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), 
effective since 8 October 2004; Braendle/Noll, SE, 1,4; Herdegen, §14 III; Eidenmüller/Engert/Hornuf, ECGI 
127/2009, 1-3. 
83
 Herdegen, §14 III. 
84
 Council regulation 2157/2001 as of 8 October 2001 on the statute for a European company (SE); SE Regulation 
and council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard 
to the involvement of employees. 
85
 Braendle/Noll, SE, 1, 4. 
86
 European Company Implementation Act as of 22 December 2004 (Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen Ge-
sellschaft) (BGBl. I, p. 3675). 
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IV. Corporate Governance in Germany 
Germany got into the “corporate governance game”
87
 comparatively late. However, at the 
latest, since the implementation of the German Corporate Governance Code the topic is all 
around and highly controversial discussed.
88
 The further focus of this part shall therefore lay on 
corporate governance since it uniquely illustrates the development of the manner in which corpo-
rate law is made and the adaption of German corporate law to the ongoing internationalization 
and Europeanization. 
There are uncountable reputed definitions of the term corporate governance,
89
 that all in-
volve the organization, management and control of companies as well as the functionality of the 
management and control bodies of the company and the control of its behavior, either through 
external mechanisms or through internal provisions of its corporate constitution.
90
 Corporate 
governance ultimately aims globally recognized standards for good and thoroughly leadership 
and supervision of companies,
91
 in order to improve the company’s efficiency and to increase 
shareholder value.
92
 Corporate Governance can therefore be best described as the sum of all legal 
and actual rules and provisions for the leadership and the supervision of (noted) companies.
93
 
Various media-effective acquisitions, management issues and company crises moved the 
topic into general awareness.
94
 Cases, in which the board of an AG could practice bad specula-
tions, mismanagement or deceitful actions that only came to light when creditors, business part-
ners and shareholders suffered damages running into millions and thousands of employees lost 
their jobs.
95
 Moreover, the financial crisis brought further failures to light.
96
 Nevertheless, corpo-
rate governance is more than mere weak point analysis, aiming to prevent described crises.
97
 The 
discussion about corporate governance also entails a fundamental rethinking of general concerns 
of the capital markets on, such as transparency and management principles, on an international 
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level, increasing the competitive aspect of the economy, resulting in the shareholder to be ena-
bled to be more selective.
98
 
In this context, the history of Germany plays an important role shaping corporate law 
through its specific needs after both world wars. For a long time, the main focus of German 
economy was the rapid reconstruction of the industries and the economy. In these times only few 
investors invested in stocks. In need of other forms of financing, companies focused mainly on 
bank loans, wherefore shareholder played a comparatively minor role.
99
 With the stabilization 
and resurrection of the German economy and the entrance into the international competition this 
changed, so that German companies were then faced with big competitors.
100
 
Against this background, the idea over a public and easily accessible corporate govern-
ance code, as known of other jurisdictions, arose, that should help eliminating competitive disad-
vantages  of German companies, marketing German companies
101
 to foreign investors and 
providing those with an overview of the German corporate governance model and the German 
corporate constitution.
102
 
1. “Legal” basis: The German Corporate Governance Code 
On 26 February 2002 the German governmental commission named “Deutscher Corpo-
rate Governance Kodex”, that was appointed by the Federal Government, decided the code of the 
same name and handed it over to the Federal Minister of Justice.
103
 Meanwhile the German Cor-
porate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, hereafter referred to as 
“DCGK”)
104
 already has been published in the electronic Federal Gazette
105
 and has been sup-
plemented and amended several times.
106
 
Before, two private initiatives developed codes and principles that were then replaced by 
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the DCGK.
107
 However, the decisive impulses were international ones, being the OECD Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance of 1999 and the English “Combined Code of Best Practice” of 
1998
108
 serving as precursors.
109
 
The DCGK introduced recommendations for standards of conduct for the management 
boards and the supervisory boards of listed company.
110
 It consists of a summary of legal provi-
sions concerning the management and supervision of companies. Furthermore, the DCGK rec-
ommends compliance with rules and provisions that are aimed to prevent the weaknesses of the 
corporate constitution in Germany, such as the lacking transparency of German management and 
the limited orientation of the interests of shareholders.
111
  
2. Section 161 of the AktG 
The governmental commission not only worked out the code itself, but also proposed, 
what nowadays is held by section 161 of the AktG. The idea is to link the code to an obligation to 
publish a declaration of conformity
112
 demanding the managing and the supervisory board of 
listed companies to declare annually whether or not the recommendations of the DCGK were 
followed.
113
 This declarations need to be permanently available to the shareholders,
114
 which is 
supposed to create pressure in order to further encourage compliance with the provisions of the 
DCGK.
115
 
3. Structure of the DCGK 
The provisions of the DCGK are divided in three categories. In accordance with its mis-
sion to inform about the existing law, half of the DCGK is a reproduction and description of the 
law.
116
 Another large part are recommendations marked with the word “shall”, meaning that 
companies can deviate but are, however, obliged to “comply or explain” according to section 161 
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of the AktG.
117
 Finally, the DCGK contains suggestions indicated by the word “should”, being in 
no way legally binding but suggested to ensure good corporate governance.
118
 
4. Legal nature of the DCGK or “comply or explain” 
Although the DCGK came into force more than ten years ago the classification from a le-
gal-dogmatic perspective still turns out to be complex.
119
 The code, as a summary of mere rec-
ommendations, is technically not binding, yet has a legal basis. The DCGK attains normative 
force through section 161 of the AktG,
120
 a legally binding provision of a parliamentary legisla-
tive proceeding. The code itself was, however, worked out by a governmental commission and 
therefore did not pass a legislative parliamentary procedure.
121
  
The wording as well as its legal presentation further illustrate the self-conception of the 
code being not legally binding.
122
 The law explicitly allows companies to explain that they chose 
to opt-out certain provisions or the whole code.
123
 Following the British model this phenomenon 
is captured by the concise formulation of “comply or explain”
124
, which might be, however, de-
ceptive, since the companies are not asked to explain, but to merely state if they complied with 
the code or not.
125 
Yet, No. 3.10 of the Code itself recommends to explain potential deviations 
from the code, so that the formulation “comply or explain” also fits the German model. 
The code does not fit in the traditional German system of legal sources,
126
 wherefore the 
classifying of the code turns out to be difficult, especially in terms of enforcement.
127
 Often, the 
DCGK will be referred to as “soft law”
128
 since the provisions of the code can voluntarily be 
called in and non-compliance cannot be legally punished.
129
 However, the fact that the provisions 
of the DCGK are legally non-binding rather implicates that the provisions cannot be described as 
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any kind of legally binding law,
130
 wherefore the regular division of soft and hard law does not 
provide any help.  
Further, the German Corporate Governance Code is no trade usage in the sense of section 
346 of the HGB,
131
 since it misses a common and voluntary practice.
132
 It is also is not captured 
by customary law since the legislatively granted possibility of voluntary adoption would conflict 
the legislator’s intention to not be legally binding by customary law.
133
 Finally, an introduced 
doctrine of secondary sources of law attempts to describe the binding effect of rules created by 
private entities such as the DCGK,
134
 but, however, misjudges the factual, economic forces ef-
fecting companies in acting, being the market itself and the intent to compete. 
The binding effect of the legally non-binding DCGK can be explained by the market pres-
sure.
135
 Especially the case of Germany, which was originally shy towards corporate governance 
standards, serves as a good example to illustrate to which extent the market pressure drills juris-
dictions out of their own national legal tradition towards market-resist solutions.
136
 Furthermore, 
the companies act out of the fear to be punished by the market, since the declarations need to be 
made public and investors might prefer companies complying with the rules rather than not, mak-
ing self-interest and the intent to not lose the trust of investors another factor of the indirectly 
binding effect of the code.
137
  
In this context the financial press also plays an important role.
138
 Not compliance can nat-
urally become a discussed topic, so that the companies might also act out of the fear to be legally 
sanctioned by losing their reputation through non-compliance.
139
 Summing up, compliance with 
the code is voluntarily, however there is an indirect operating duty to comply.
140
 Since this duty 
is of no legal nature, the force acts on the grounds of self-regulation and market pressure.
141
 
Concluding on the legal nature of the code, it does not appear surprising in light of German law-
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making history that a code, worked out by a governmental commission, consisting of a summary 
of recommendations by a non-legislative institution, operating in the way of self-regulation, will 
be subject to criticism and incomprehension.
142
 However, the “legal” form of the DCGK proved, 
as especially the larger companies rather intended to comply than to risk being punished by the 
market, wherefore the concept of self-regulation was successful.
143
 Furthermore, since the code 
does not have to pass legislative instances, flexibility in which the code can react to market hap-
penings is a central advantage.
144
 Summing up, the code constitutes an interesting approach of a 
new phenomenon lying somewhere between self-regulation and regulation by law.
145
 
5. The DCGK under German constitutional law 
After all, the legal nature of the DCGK is problematic under German constitutional 
law.
146
 Main points of criticism in academia and literature were the doubted constitutional con-
formity of the code as well as the lacking parliamentary involvement.
147
 In particular, the author-
ship of the code can be subject to criticism in light of democratic legitimacy.
148
 According to arti-
cle 20 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz)
149
 all state power 
emanates from the people. In case the code should be classified by public law it would be subject 
to democratic legitimacy.
150
 Prerequisites for this would be adequate standards on factual and 
personal legitimacy. This standard is provided by the provision of section 161 of the AktG, 
wherefore the argument against the democratic legitimacy of the DCGK can be easily levered.
151
 
The same applies for the argument concerning the parliamentary involvement, since section 161 
of the AktG passed the regular legislative rule-making process, wherefore the interaction of the 
code and section 161 of the AktG invalidate most points of constitutional criticism.
152
 
V. Conclusion 
The manner in which corporate law is made in Germany has been a product and affected 
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by its history. For this reason and for a better understanding of the German legal tradition in re-
gard of codifications and other particularities, the most important steps of history were shown. As 
much as the attitude of German corporate law towards codifications changed back and forth in 
the course of time, today’s flexibility and adaptability of German law-making as shown on the 
VorstAG was unequalled on this level. Bearing in mind, that Germany had to catch up with its 
international competition with years behind, because of its historical background, the VorstAG 
shows that Germany finally caught up and plays with the international competition on a high lev-
el, setting new standards and maybe even handling the resulting situation of the financial crisis 
more efficient than other countries. 
Furthermore, an expression of today’s manner in which corporate law is made is the 
DCGK. The DCGK, as well, greatly contributed to the competitiveness of Germany on an inter-
national comparison. Before the adoption of the code, foreign investors experienced fears of con-
tacts to German corporate law being faced with a comparatively small capital market, no compa-
rable supervisory institutions as the SEC, 400 sections in the decisive law and a foreign lan-
guage.
153
  
Even if the legal nature of the code is subject to controversial discussions, the code stood 
the test and performed its task to inform foreign investors about German corporate law and there-
by create pressure for the companies to comply and to attract investors in a process of not law but 
the self-regulation of the market.
154
 
Looking ahead, a way back to codifications and more nationally orientated laws seems 
unlikely. The trend is towards a harmonized law on a European level with the EuGH setting the 
tone as it did with its decisions regarding the freedom of establishment. 
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C. United States 
In order to research on the topic of the manner in which corporate law and financial regu-
lation are made, three methodologies have applied, which are: First, the legal theories of corpo-
rate law and financial regulation. Second, the development through the historical perspective of 
them and finally, the comparative law method which is going to be applied in the comparative 
part of this research paper. Since this topic is very broad, researcher decided to focus mainly on 
corporate governance related matters. As a result, this research paper will wholly illustrate and 
discuss on the U.S. law and related financial regulations in regarding to the U.S. corporate gov-
ernance which can briefly define as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”.
155
 
I. The U.S. Corporate Governance Structure  
The U.S. corporate law has a distinct attribute as every state has its own basic corporate 
statues, while federal law creates minimum standards for trade in company shares and govern-
ance rights for publicly traded corporation. The U.S. Constitution was interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to allow corporations to incorporate in the state of their choice, regardless of 
where their headquarters are.
156
 Therefore, regarding to the realm of corporate law and financial 
regulation, there are two main sources of corporate governance in the U.S. which are state law 
and federal statue. 
1. State Law 
In the U.S., the term “corporation” generally refers to incorporated business entities, or 
entities chartered under the laws of a particular state. The corporate law of a state where a corpo-
ration was incorporated generally governs that corporation. Despite some attempts to unify cor-
porate law in the U.S. (e.g. the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, which was adopted by 
many states)
157
, the corporate laws of various states differ. Therefore, some states, notably Dela-
ware has become almost a brand name for the “business” of serving as the official home for cor-
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porations (especially American public corporation)
158
 since: First, the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law (DGCL) is one of the most advanced and flexible corporation statutes in the nation. 
Second, the Delaware courts are highly respected for corporation suits, both the Court of Chan-
cery and the Delaware Supreme Court. Third, the state legislature takes seriously its role in keep-
ing the corporation statute and other business laws current. Finally, the DGCL is, in a sense, have 
been using as a model corporate law in other jurisdictions. Hence, when this research paper men-
tions about state law, it shall refer to DGCL.  
To be concise, business entities in the USA may take the form of a sole proprietorship, 
partnerships (general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership and limited 
liability limited partnership), a limited liability company (LLC), and corporation (private and 
public) including S corporation and C corporation which are subject to different taxation rules. 
However, we will focus solely on corporation which in particular contains five characteristics; 
legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, centralized management under a board 
structure, and shared ownership by contributors of capital.
159
 
(1) Legal personality 
One can create a corporation by filing a document called the article of incorporation with 
the appropriate government office of the chosen state of incorporation, then the state will an-
nounce the existence of the corporation
160
. By permitting the corporation to serve as a single con-
tracting party that is distinct from the various individuals who own or manage the firm. It en-
hances the ability of these individuals to engage together in joint projects. The core function of 
this separate personality has been termed ‘entity shielding,’ to separate the assets of the corpora-
tion from the corporation’s owners. 
(2) Limited liability 
The creditors are limited to making claims against assets that are held in the name of the 
corporation itself, and have no claim against assets that the firm’s shareholders hold in their own 
names. It protects the assets of the firm’s owners from the claims of the firm’s creditors and shifts 
downside business risk from shareholders to creditors. This makes creditors as monitors of the 
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firm’s managers, a task which they may be in a better position to perform than are the sharehold-
ers in a firm in which share ownership is widely dispersed. 
(3) Transferable shares 
Transferability permits the firm to conduct business uninterruptedly as the identity of its 
owners changes and in turn enhances the liquidity of shareholders’ interests and makes it easier 
for shareholders to construct and maintain diversified investment portfolios. 
(4) Centralized management under a board structure 
Corporate law typically vests principal authority over corporate affairs in a board of direc-
tors or similar committee organ that is periodically elected, exclusively or primarily, by the firm’s 
shareholders. Corporations are distinguished by a governance structure in which all but the most 
fundamental decisions are delegated to a board of directors. 
(5) Shared ownership by contributors of capital 
Investors of the corporation have two rights which are the right to control the firm, and 
the right to receive the firm’s net earnings. More specifically, investors have the right to partici-
pate in control which generally involves voting in the election of directors and voting to approve 
major transactions and the right to receive the firm’s residual earnings, or profits that typically 
proportional to the amount of capital contributed to the firm. 
The basic rights of shareholders relative to directors in the corporate entity have been de-
termined in the state law level, as federal law has not supplanted the shareholder-director rela-
tionship as determined by the states.
161
 Under corporate law in all states, directors manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation. Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote, sell, 
or litigate. 
To start with voting, shareholders’ voting right is a key part of corporate law, but that 
does not mean that shareholders can vote on every issue. Most business decisions are left entirely 
to the board of directors or those to whom they delegate such authority. Shareholders participate 
only infrequently in a limited set of decisions, including the election of directors, fundamental 
corporate changes, and ratification. In details as follows: 
(1) Election of directors: Directors are usually elected annually, but this pattern can be 
varied by the corporation’s articles of incorporation or other private ordering. Shareholders also 
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have the power to remove directors in some circumstances. Under DGCL, staggered board (clas-
sified board) is very popular among U.S. corporations
162
, A company with a staggered board 
groups directors into classes (typically three), with each class elected by shareholders at succes-
sive annual meetings. Together with poison pills that consist of stock warrants or rights that allow 
the holder to buy an acquirer’s stock (a so-called “flip over” provision), or the target’s stock (a 
“flip in” provision), or both, at a substantial discount from the market price. They provide anti-
takeover protection both by forcing any hostile bidder, no matter when it emerges, to wait at least 
one year to gain control of the board and requiring such a bidder to win two elections far apart in 
time rather than a one-time referendum on its offer. 
(2) Fundamental corporate changes: Mergers and similar transactions require the approval 
of shareholders as well as directors and, thus, are an exception to the usual rule that leaves corpo-
rate decisions entirely in the hands of the directors. In many cases, the directors act as gatekeep-
ers: The shareholders can vote only on those transactions that are recommended to them by the 
directors. 
(3) Ratification: Shareholders occasionally vote on the ratification of self-dealing transac-
tions by interested directors. The vote can cleanse the transaction of any taint or shift the burden 
of proof in a legal challenge. 
Secondly, Selling, the ability to sell one’s shares is a core right for shareholders and one 
that corporate law has, for the most part, left to the market. Appraisal right is a rare exception 
where corporate law guarantees shareholders the right to sell their shares.
163
 
Thirdly, litigating, in addition to voting and selling, a shareholder’s ability to sue serves 
as a constraint on the actions of managers and is a regular part of the governance foundation. Lit-
igation rights of shareholders include derivative suits, direct suits and class actions, and inspec-
tion and other ancillary rights.
164
 
(1) Derivative suits: In particular circumstances, such as breaches of fiduciary duty by 
those in control of the corporation, DGCL permits a shareholder to bring a suit in the name of, 
and on behalf of, the corporate entity. This type of suit is an exception to the usual rule that direc-
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tors act for the corporation. It occurs when directors are disabled by conflict or are otherwise un-
able to meet their fiduciary duty. 
(2) Direct suits and class actions: Shareholders can also bring direct suits, which may be 
class actions if numerous shareholders are affected by common questions. In contrast to deriva-
tive suits, in which the loss to the shareholder is derivative of the harm to the collective enter-
prise, direct suits may be brought for an injury that the shareholder feels individually, such as 
deprivation of a right to vote or a contract right. 
(3) Inspection and other ancillary rights: Shareholders also have ancillary rights at state 
law, such as the right to inspect the books and records of the corporation, including the list of 
shareholders. Such inspection may be the first salvo in a litigation battle, an effort to sell shares, 
or a voting campaign. 
On the other hand, the U.S. courts and state legislators have developed a robust fiduciary 
standard through time to set standards for board of directors of the company to use their manage-
rial discretion for utmost shareholders’ value. Corporate director’s fiduciary duties generally fall 
into two principle categories. These are the duties of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of 
loyalty requires that corporate fiduciaries duty exercises their authority in a good faith attempt to 
advance corporate purposes. In particular, it bars directors from competing with corporation; ap-
propriating its property, information, or business opportunities; and especially from transacting 
business with it on unfair terms. By contrast, the duty of care reaches every aspect of a director’s 
conduct. It requires director to act with “the care of an ordinarily prudent person in the same or 
similar circumstances.” By the way, the key for applying and adjusting these concepts by court is 
the “business judgement rule.”
165
 
2. The Idea behind State Law 
In the U.S., corporation is developed to serve as a tool to increase shareholders welfare or 
in other words, it maximizes the size of the economic pie for stockholders. On the other hand, 
corporate law enables entrepreneurs to transact easily through the medium of the corporate entity, 
and thus lowers the costs of conducting business. Corporate law in the U.S. has long been 
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evolved under the influence of a relationship between shareholders and director.
166
 The long bat-
tle between the conservative, private, shareholder-wealth-maximization school of corporate legal 
thought and the progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility school is now 
over.
167
 The victor, it is claimed, is the conservative school, also known as the “nexus-of-
contracts” approach
168
, which holds that corporations should be run for the exclusive benefit of 
shareholders (“shareholder primacy”).
169
 This is the backbone principle of the U.S. corporate law 
leads us to the current idea of the U.S. corporate governance. In order to invigorate the mentioned 
idea, as a common law jurisdiction, the most appropriate way is to start with a prominent case of 
the topic which for this study is the “Dodge v. Ford Motor Company”
170
 case. 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 
This case, ruled by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1919, indicates that the corporation 
have to operate in the interests of its shareholders, rather than in a charitable manner for the bene-
fit of its employees or customers. It is often cited as affirming the principle of "shareholder pri-
macy" in the US corporate law. On the other hand, the case also affirmed the business judgment 
rule, leaving director an extremely wide discretion about how to run the business. The case can 
be briefed as follow. 
The shareholder made their complaint and demand for further dividends after the Ford 
Motor Company had concluded its most prosperous year of business but declared no special divi-
dend during the business year. It had been the practice for the company, under similar circum-
stances, to declare larger dividends. It had been the policy of the corporation for a considerable 
time to annually reduce the selling price of cars, while keeping up, or improving, their quality. 
The plan is not intended to produce immediately a more profitable business, but a less profitable 
one; not only less profitable than formerly, but less profitable than it is admitted it might be 
made. The apparent immediate effect will be to diminish the value of shares and the returns to 
shareholders. Instead, Henry Ford’s ambition is to still employ more men, to spread the benefits 
of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and 
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their homes. In order to do this the company needed to pay sixty per cent of its capitalization to 
reinvest for the growth of the company. As a result, no dividends other than the regular dividends 
had been paid. The Court held that Henry Ford could not lower consumer prices and raise em-
ployee salaries. In its opinion, the discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to the reduction of profits or the non-distribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to benefit the public. Because this company was in business 
for profit, it could not be turned into a charity. This case turned finally upon the point, the ques-
tion, whether it appears that the directors were not acting for the best interests of the corporation. 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders and 
the powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end 
itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order 
to devote them to other purposes. There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion to 
be exercised in good faith. 
Combining all the information above together, they not only made the corporation 
uniquely attractive for organizing productive activity but also generate tensions and tradeoffs that 
lend a distinctively corporate character to the agency problems that corporate governance must 
address.
171
 It is undeniable that the agency problem is one of the most essential and all-time dis-
cussed problem in the U.S. Possibility of conflict between shareholders and director has long 
been with us and will continue to be so long as business activity is conducted through the corpo-
rate form. Corporate governance now provides a tested and familiar nomenclature for addressing 
the issues involved, and a substitute analytical paradigm has yet to emerge. Then the most power-
ful protection against wrongdoing or simple misdirection of corporate asset is a good corporate 
governance and, in the U.S., they emerge from best practices that are accepted in the market-
place.
172
 
3. Federal Statute 
There has been superimposed upon state corporation law a vitally important and constant-
ly expanding area of regulation consisting of the federal securities acts and their rules and regula-
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tions (the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by 
laws like the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 and the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010).  In this connection, major attention 
has been focused on federal securities regulation. This aspect of "federal corporation law"
173
 
looms large on the current corporate scene. The approach of the federal securities laws has not 
been to define or create the internal corporate relationship between directors and shareholders, 
but to make that relationship better for shareholders or investors.
174
 For federal securities laws, 
usually has been defined through greater disclosure requirements for publicly traded corpora-
tions. In addition, it has also been developed through the attempt to prevent future uproar against 
systemic loopholes and financial crises. Accordingly, the historical facts suggest a much more 
piecemeal evolution.
175
 Then the best way to explain the distinction of the U.S. corporate govern-
ance is to display by historical perspective and fulfill with the external factors behind those 
changes. 
a) Managerial Capitalism Era 
Between 1960s and 1970s, it was a decade characterized by strong managers and weak 
owners,
176
 as corporate law tended to increasing flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for 
shareholders. Corporate ownership became dispersed and the separation of ownership and control 
was seen as giving power to managers and resulting in what came to be called agency prob-
lems.
177
 Individuals rarely were actively engaged in corporate governance and shareholder activ-
ism achieved little influence.
178
 During this period the U.S. corporate law is a matter of state ra-
ther than federal regulation. Only securities law is regulated at the federal level, and the emphasis 
of the SEC is usually on disclosure rather than substantive provisions regarding company struc-
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ture
179
. Many investor rights are essentially vested with the board, companies have great latitude 
in shaping the structure and powers of boards in practice. The federal nature of corporate law laid 
the foundations for managerialism within U.S. corporate governance, since shareholders rights 
remained relatively weak under this competitive structure. Corporate boards were predominately 
made up of insiders, chosen from company executives and former executives, or friends of the 
executives.
180
 These directors had a largely advisory role, and would rarely overturn or even 
mount major challenge to executives’ decision. Meanwhile, shareholders had little direct say on 
the election of board members, since legal rules required them to go through an expensive pro-
cess of proxy voting rather than having direct access to propose candidates.
181
 After this, the SEC 
began requiring disclosure of the existence of an audit committee and published guidelines about 
the activities of audit committees. Meanwhile, no regulations existed regarding compensation 
committees. Executive remuneration consisted mostly of fixed salaries and bonuses tied to annual 
performance of the company. Salaries were strongly correlated to the size of company revenues, 
and remained relatively insensitive to corporate performance or long-term value creation.
182
 
 Although the U.S. has never developed a stakeholder model of corporate governance, 
managerial capitalism did allow scope for certain elements of quasi-stakeholder orientation.
183
 
Firms developed paternalistic forms of ‘welfare capitalism’ characterized by stable employment 
and large internal labor markets, particularly for white-collar employees.
184
 However, the U.S. 
law enshrined a strict distinction between firm governance and contractual bargaining relation-
ships with employees, who were seen as external to the corporation and restricted the scope of 
collective bargaining in ways that protected managerial prerogative. Nonetheless, labor union 
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strength and commitments to core employees exerted some check on managerial authority and 
retained some significance in managerial decision making during this period.
185
  
b) Investor Capitalism Era 
During the 1980s, the power of managers was challenged by a variety of new develop-
ments. Power began to shift substantially toward investors due to the rise of new types of institu-
tional investors and the advent of hostile takeovers. Institutional investors emerged as an im-
portant new category of shareholder. Institutional investors had diversified portfolios and became 
much more active players in corporate governance, using their growing blocks to exercise greater 
voice in corporate management.
186
 Most strikingly, a wave of hostile takeovers threatened the 
dominance of U.S. managers. The diversified conglomerates of the past decades proved to be 
undervalued in the stock market by the emerging institutional investors, as an aftermath, diversi-
fied firms were taken over at high rates.
187
 Parallel to these changes, the role of the board also 
underwent a critical examination. As the rapid increase in the proportion of independent directors 
and a growing number of outside directors were appointed at this period, but executives still re-
tained almost complete control over the actual selection process. Executives continued to see 
directors nominated by shareholders as lacking independence and representing the particular in-
terests of a shareholder group.
188
 
By the way, the growing attention to stock prices and ‘shareholder value’ also placed ex-
ecutive pay under growing scrutiny, and shifted attention to strengthening links between pay and 
company performance. A key development here was the introduction of share options and other 
equity-based incentives. Equity-based incentives were also used to reward managers under lever-
aged buy-out schemes. Finally, to weaken their resistance to hostile bids, managers were offered 
‘golden parachutes’ that awarded bonuses to those managers who lost their jobs in association 
with changes in corporate control.
189
 However, shareholders have no direct ‘say on pay’ under 
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corporate law, hence leaving it to the board to influence the size and form of managerial pay 
schemes. 
c) Executive Defense and the Ideology of Shareholder Value Era 
In 1990s, the trend toward greater shareholder influence continued, but was reshaped by 
the responses of managers. On one hand, executives sought to defend their own power by shield-
ing firms from unwanted takeover bids. On the other hand, managers aligned themselves increas-
ingly with the interests of shareholders through new forms of executive pay and adopting the ide-
ology of shareholder value. Shareholder value refers to the concept that the primary goal for a 
company is to increase the wealth of its shareholders by paying dividends and/or causing the 
stock price to increase. Somewhat paradoxically, although shareholder power was tamed, share-
holder value became a powerful new ideology.
190
 In terms of share ownership, institutional inves-
tors not only grew in size, but gradually began voting more actively against takeover defenses 
proposed by management and even supported initiatives to remove such defenses.
191
 Besides, 
federal proxy rules were revised to give shareholders enhanced latitude to communicate amongst 
themselves. Then, the scope of issues targeted by shareholder activism expanded further to cover 
changes in board structure and function, as well as executive and director compensation.
192
 
By the early 1990s, the proportion of independent directors has increased among the pub-
lic firms. Meanwhile, this trend slowly spread to smaller firms. Despite the growing importance 
of independence, two facts are worth noting. First, the legal definition of an independent director 
remained rather weakly developed and was specified only in state corporation law. Second, a 
majority of U.S. firms still combined the role of CEO and chairman within the board. This fact 
puts some doubt on the genuine independence of other board members.
193
 In particular, the rise of 
equity-based pay such as stock options had given managers a greater stake in promoting restruc-
turing and orientating their strategies toward the stock market. In addition, the SEC had changed 
the rule, making possible for executives to exercise stock options and sell their stocks at the same 
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time, thereby exploiting very short-term movements in stock prices to their own advantage.
194
 
The 1990s was the decade in which senior executive compensation shifted from being primarily 
cash-based to being primarily stock-based. With this change, management became focused not 
simply on the relationship between market price and break-up value (which the advent of the 
bust-up takeover compelled them to watch), but on the likely future performance of their firm’s 
stock over the short-term. Far more than the hostile takeover, equity compensation induced man-
agement to obsess over their firm’s day-to-day share price.
195
 As a result, the new forms of exec-
utive pay, greater executive turnover, and golden parachutes, shifted managerial interests away 
from the long-term development of the firm, and linked their own interests with shareholder val-
ue.
196
 
d) The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (The Sar-
banes–Oxley Act) 
By the early 2000s, the U.S. corporate governance were in big remodel by increasing 
shareholder engagement, expanding boards’ independent and rewarding through long-term equity 
based incentives linked to share price performance, providing more flow of information from the 
board which must be certified by outside gatekeepers, such as auditors and accountants.
197
 This 
reformation of corporate governance was triggered by the crisis and collapse of Enron sparked a 
wide-ranging re-examination of corporate governance in the U.S. Enron (also happened to Tyco 
International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WorldCom) exposed the fact that the various 
elements of that time system were not functioning together. To begin with, the ground for this 
reform is that shareholders failed to rationally value Enron because the Enron board failed to pro-
tect the integrity of financial disclosure.
198
 These board members also had high levels of relevant 
competence, and were incentivized by stock options or other equity-based incentives. The execu-
tives of Enron were incentivized to adopt high-risk strategies oriented to earnings management 
and propping up an overvalued stock in order to maintain the value of their stock options. Fur-
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thermore, gatekeepers such as the auditing firm of Arthur Anderson critically failed as an effec-
tive interface between management and investors.
199
 Finally, unlike situations were corporations 
underperform, the market for corporate control provided little effective discipline or remedy for 
the “over-valued” stock prices at Enron.
200
 This situation can be easily stated as executives were 
stealing from the company. 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate 
and accounting scandals. It created many changes on corporate governance which can be grouped 
under three categories:
201
 audit-related changes, board-related changes, changes in disclosure and 
accounting rules, and shareholder empowerment. This is a big overhaul in the U.S. corporate 
governance system. 
First, audit-related changes can be grouped into two major categories: 
Conflict-reducing rules could be done by three methods:  
(1) Limits on multiple roles and services by auditors as external auditors are prohibited 
from providing certain kinds of non-audit services to their auditing clients. In practical terms, this 
means they may not help clients choose, install, and operate accounting-related tasks. 
(2) Shift the power to hire, fire and compensate the external auditors to the company’s 
audit committee and require that all members of the audit committee must be “independent,” and 
also gave the new definitions of independence are stricter than past. 
(3) Reduction of interpersonal bonding between auditors and the audited by having a 
mandatory periodic rotation of audit firms, and requiring that audit engagement partners and au-
dit reviewing partners must be rotated off the engagement after five years. 
Action-inducing rules can be done by four methods: 
(1) Required internal control processes by requiring attestations about the effectiveness of 
internal accounting controls. Under the new regime, public companies must have a system of 
internal controls, management must make disclosures and attestations about the internal controls, 
and the external auditors must also test and evaluate the system. 
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(2) Certification of financial reports by requiring the SEC to adopt rules requiring princi-
pal executive officers and principal financial officers of reporting companies to certify quarterly 
and annual reports. Specifically, these officers must now verify that they have actually reviewed 
the report. 
(3) Requiring financial literacy and financial expertise on audit committees for increasing 
the chance that the committees will monitor well and effectively. 
(4) Introducing new and independent auditing regulatory body called the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the function of which is to oversee and regulate external 
auditing firms and their auditing processes. 
Second, board-related changes may be grouped into two categories: 
Providing conflict-reducing standards as exchanges require higher standard for listing 
public companies to have a majority of independent directors on their boards (with an exception 
for controlled companies) with stricter definitions of independence. In addition, the key commit-
tees which are audit, compensation, and nominating committee can contain only independent 
directors. Then, increasing action-inducing standards for directors to act diligently by providing 
feedback of performance to them. Furthermore, require all members of audit committees to be 
financially literate. Last but not least, require boards to adopt and disclose both “corporate gov-
ernance guidelines” and “a code of business conduct and ethics” and also require boards to en-
gage formally in periodic self-assessments and evaluations. 
Third, disclosure enhancements and accounting rule changes; this involves financial dis-
closures to shareholders and other public investors. The underlying premise is that better infor-
mation enables investors to use their powers more effectively. The disclosure rules will be added 
new duties and liabilities for agents and gatekeepers. 
 The details can be summarized as: 
(1) Off-balance-sheet arrangements by requires public companies to disclose more about 
special purpose entities and off-balance-sheet arrangements. 
(2) Critical accounting policies by forcing public companies to identify and discuss their 
“critical accounting policies” in their annual form 10-K reports (which are filed with the SEC and 
available online to the public). 
(3) Related party transactions are obstructed by requires public companies to disclose 
more, and more about, related party transactions. The premise is that such transactions might be 
Comparative Corporate Governance – A Global Research Seminar 
33 
unfair to the company and its shareholders, and public disclosure may discourage unfairness or 
facilitate remedial action. 
(4) Accelerated filing requirements by mandates accelerated filing requirements for public 
companies. 
(5) Expensing stock options by requires listed companies to expense stock options and 
disclose that information to public. 
Fourth, shareholder empowerment; the best illustration of this point is the proposed SEC 
rule to allow shareholder nomination of directors under certain conditions. More precisely, the 
rule would allow shareholders meeting the requirements to put alternative nominees on the com-
pany’s proxy statement, which is distributed to all of its shareholders at the company’s expense, 
and thus save these shareholders from the high cost of preparing and distributing their own proxy 
materials. Another example of an atmospherically facilitated governance change is the shift from 
classified boards to annual election of all directors at an increasing number of companies are fol-
lowing this.  
  Nevertheless, SOX produced changes in corporate governance standards applicable to 
U.S. corporation governance but it did not come all at once, or from one standard-setting source, 
but in related waves.
202
 Beginning with the federal level which enacted sweeping governance 
changes and called for the SEC to adopt implementing rules and procedures on various topics. 
Then follow by the new listing requirements for publicly traded companies governed by the ex-
changes that impose new corporate governance rules, for instance, the New York Stock Exchange 
CG Rule. Next, the growth in influence of increasingly detailed and stringent corporate govern-
ance rating systems devised by private rating agencies and proxy advisers. Finally, an apparent 
change in the tone and emphasis of judicial opinions, at least in important courts of Delaware 
made corporate governance in the U.S. tangible and robust. 
e) The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 which major roots of problem are rapid 
growth of credit extension (including for residential mortgages) with deteriorating credit stand-
ards, financial product innovation, leverage of financial institutions, and flaws of securitized 
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credit intermediation.
203
 Congress passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). Even though, most of the provisions deal with financial regulation but 
some provisions, however, also impose new corporate governance regulations to all public corpo-
rations.
204
  
We can conclude that the failure of conventional corporate governance can be divided in-
to three categories which consist of:
205
    
1. Formalism of corporate governance: the last era has developed in the direction of a rel-
atively formalistic system of independence requirements for members of the board of directors 
and its committees, as well as under the SOX. All of these requirements illustrate primarily driv-
en by events such as Enron and WorldCom, where integrity was perceived to be at the center of 
the problems. 
2. Structure and process rather than content: the last era focus on structure and process, 
the content of risk management and control activities as well as the experience of board members 
may arguably not have received the attention they would have deserved. 
3. Corporate governance as a co-sponsor of the crisis: As the boards of directors had led 
into the crisis with independent rather than experienced board members. For their risk manage-
ment efforts, they will have emphasized structure and process of the controls, rather than trying to 
understand the substance of the risk. 
 The aforesaid reasons have leaded to the amendment of provisions to the U.S. corporate 
governance circle.
206
 
First, the “say on pay” mandate which requires periodic shareholder advisory votes on ex-
ecutive compensation. To be more precise, this provision forces reporting companies must con-
duct a shareholder advisory vote on specified executive compensation not less frequently than 
every three years. At least once every six years, shareholders must vote on how frequently to hold 
such an advisory vote. In addition, a shareholder advisory vote is required with respect to golden 
parachutes. The vote must be tabulated and disclosed, but is not binding on the board of directors. 
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Second, the compensation committees of reporting companies must be fully independent 
and that those committees be given certain specified oversight responsibilities. 
Third, the SEC require companies to provide additional disclosures with respect to execu-
tive compensation. By each reporting company’s annual proxy statement must contain a clear 
exposition of the relationship between executive compensation and the issuer’s financial perfor-
mance. The disclosure must give investors an easy way of comparing executive compensation 
and firm performance over time. The proxy statement also must disclose whether employees are 
allowed to hedge the value of company stock they own. 
Fourth, expands SOX’s rules regarding clawbacks of executive compensation. In the 
event a corporation is obliged to restate its financial statements due to “misconduct,” the CEO 
and CFO must return to the corporation any bonus, incentive, or equity-based compensation they 
received during the 12 months following the original issuance of the restated financials, along 
with any profits they realized from the sale of corporate stock during that period. Dodd-Frank 
significantly expands this provision by direct the self-regulatory organizations to require their 
listed companies to disclose company policies for clawing back incentive-based compensation 
paid to current or former executive officers in the event of a restatement of the company’s finan-
cials due to material non-compliance with any federal securities law financial reporting require-
ment. Issuers failing to adopt such a policy must be delisted. 
Fifth, affirms that the SEC has authority to promulgate a so-called “shareholder access” 
rule pursuant to which shareholders would be allowed to use the company’s proxy statement to 
nominate candidates to the board of directors. 
Sixth, requires that companies disclose whether the same person holds both the CEO and 
Chairman of the Board positions and why they either do or do not do so. 
Seventh, affords small issuers an exemption from the internal controls auditor attestation 
requirement of the SOX. By permanently exempted non-accelerated filers from compliance with 
the auditor attestation requirement. 
Eighth, provides whistleblower protections
207
 by expanding the SOX’s provision to addi-
tional employees and also apply this provision to non-publicly traded subsidiaries of publicly 
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traded companies. Moreover, including new strong monetary incentives provided to employees to 
report compliance issues to the regulators. 
Hence, Dodd-Frank marks an important expansion of the federal role in regulating corpo-
rate governance. The new provisions will have important consequences for all publicly traded 
corporations and it tends to prevent upcoming cries as well. 
4. The Idea behind Federal Statute 
Side-by-side with state law, federal statute also plays an important role for driving corpo-
rate governance in the U.S. After the realm of “deregulation policy”,
208
 the “cost-benefit analysis 
standard” is used to evaluate financial regulation again.
209
 Most of the literature on corporate 
governance has involved with this theory which has focused on explaining the relationship be-
tween the activities of a corporation and its governance structure.
210
 Federal statutes supplement 
state law principally by increasing the protection of shareholders.
211
 But, traditionally, federal law 
has not supplanted the shareholder-director relationship as determined by the states. It is a prime 
example of “the federalism.”
212
 
In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays an important role un-
der the securities law to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facili-
tate capital formation. The laws and regulations that govern the securities industry in the U.S. 
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or pri-
vate individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, 
and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose mean-
ingful financial and other information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge 
for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. 
Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people 
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make sound investment decisions.
213
 These disclosure requirements for protection of sharehold-
ers originally designed base on “the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis” (EMCH). A realistic 
appraisal of the implications of the ECMH for securities regulatory policy must be made in light 
of the stated purposes of the regulation. While the legislative histories of the securities law do not 
articulate clearly the original purposes, one purpose of the legislation was to improve the eco-
nomic functioning of the capital markets to achieve better resource allocation. The SEC, howev-
er, has come to perceive the primary purpose of the securities laws to be the protection of inves-
tors, rather than improved resource allocation. In implementing this protective purpose of the 
securities legislation, the SEC implicitly has based its regulation on an idealized model of the 
informed layperson making investment decisions in a market populated by equally informed in-
vestors. The SEC believes that it can best protect investors by making certain that all investors 
trade on the basis of equal information, which has led to a conclusion that the dominant theme of 
the securities laws is in fact "market egalitarianism."
214
 To achieve such market egalitarianism, 
and to make the informed layperson model a reality, the SEC has attempted to direct the flow of 
useful information so that it is equally available to and comprehensible by all investors. Thereby, 
the ECMH should be regarded as a vital economic tool for shaping regulation of the securities 
markets. 
Moreover, the theory of “behavioral finance” is also being used concurrently with the 
measures of mandated information disclosure and regulation of insider trading. This theory in-
volves with “behavioral decision theory” that emerged from cognitive psychology’s study of hu-
man thought processes that raised substantial doubts about rational choice theory while noise 
theory emerged from financial economists who applied those insights to capital market phenom-
ena. The result is behavioral finance, a marriage of cognitive psychology and the financial eco-
nomics of market inefficiency.
215
 It starts with a proposal to promote and expand investor educa-
tion concerning the cognitive biases behavioral finance exposes. It proceeds to introduce and 
propose reforms in three critical areas of law and policy that this model impacts: First, the market 
regulatory environment in which investors participate, including suitability and churning rules 
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and policies relating to day trading, margin trading, and circuit breakers; Second,  the legal duties 
of boards of directors in making capital allocation decisions such as equity offerings, dividend 
distributions and stock acquisitions; and finally, issues in corporate and securities litigation, prin-
cipally the reliance requirement in securities fraud cases and the stock market exception to the 
appraisal remedy in cash out mergers. The insights of behavioral finance will be useful as a tool 
in evaluating a whole range of existing and potential future legal and policy positions in corporate 
and securities law.
216
 Nevertheless, federal statutes also have developed other measures apart 
from these two theory, but the core principles still focus on them.   
5. Conclusion 
The development of corporate law and financial regulation is based on two propelling en-
gines which are the legal norms and the external factors which influenced such norms. Legal the-
ories, surrounding situations, past dilemmas, and unique legal structure are among those external 
factors. In detail, the most prominent factors are the shareholder primacy regime, the dispersed 
share ownership structure, the mandatory disclosure regime, and the competition between states. 
It is totally clear to mention that the corporate governance regime in the U.S. is mostly based on 
the relationship between shareholders and the board of director so this generic conflicts may use-
fully be characterized as the ‘agency problems.’ Therefore, corporate governance plays an im-
portant role to solve this problem by structuring through which the objectives of the company are 
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance will provide proper incentives for the board and management to pur-
sue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and also facilitate ef-
fective monitoring. Though, the characteristic of the corporate governance in the U.S. tends pri-
marily to fix past dilemmas and seal up former loop-holes but I believe that the structures and 
provisions that had established will also prevent the forthcoming cries as well. Since, the struc-
tures and provisions seems to be circumspectly tailored to make the system to be a lot more pro-
tective. Therefore, corporate governance is unlikely to become moribund from a policy or intel-
lectual perspective.
217
 The role of corporation itself emphasizes the importance of corporate gov-
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ernance. If corporation is similar to the bare bone of our body, then corporate governance is simi-
lar to flesh and blood which cover and fulfill those bare bone. 
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D. Comparative Part 
I. Legal Practice of Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany 
Since the 1990s there is an ongoing corporate governance movement.
218
 Particularly in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 stronger efforts were made in analyzing weak points 
of management behaviors against the background of their corporate governance and compliance 
system. In this context, comparative aspects are under special observation indicating the success 
or failure of the predominant corporate governance system in each jurisdiction.  
This following section shall compare and analyze the manner in which corporate govern-
ance is made concentrating on important differences between the U.S. and Germany. Special at-
tention is given to the question of harmonization of the corporate governance systems, reasons 
for this and future prospects. 
1. How Corporate Governance Is Made in the US 
In the U.S., concisely, there are two main sources of corporate governance which are state 
law and federal statutes. For state law, the most distinct one among fifty states is Delaware law 
which both excellent in judiciary and court of justice. The Delaware judiciary is a leader in 
stamping its early approval on many new legal innovation and emerging best practices relating to 
corporate governance in Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Along with, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court are also play a crucial role in making prece-
dent on corporate governance matters.
219
 American common law concerned corporate governance 
is unique since it blends both code of corporation law- DGCL- and judge-made-law together. 
However, Delaware law has only a marginal impact on changes affecting key corporate govern-
ance topics such as executive pay and shareholder activism. On the other hand, its role still con-
siderable with board of directors’ related problem, for instance, a series of well-known Delaware 
court decisions in the mid-1980s fortified the status of independent directors and provided incen-
tives for boards to be attentive. Also, Delaware court rulings helped to bring to an end the hectic 
takeover activity of the 1980s. In addition, the federal securities law and regulations, which fun-
damentally based on disclosure regime, also brings about significant change in corporate govern-
ance.  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who plays leading role on the topic, first 
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brought corporate governance on to the official reform agenda in the mid-1970s. Next, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which Congress enacted in response to high-profile corporate 
scandals involving companies, contained numerous provisions relevant to corporate governance. 
Then, The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, despite focusing primarily on the regulation of banks, con-
tained a sub-title entitled “Strengthening Corporate Governance” applicable to all issuers falling 
under the SEC’s jurisdiction.
220
 Last but not least, Private actors such as the stock exchanges also 
set corporate governance requirements in their listing rule and institutional shareholders also lob-
by for corporate governance changes as they have enough bargaining economic power as well. 
This is a summary of how corporate governance in the U.S. has been made. 
2. How Corporate Governance Is Made in Germany 
Corporative governance discusses the question of good and thoroughly leadership and su-
pervision of companies. This is nothing new to German law since questions concerning supervi-
sion and leadership traditionally were much discussed in regard of revisions of the AktG and led 
to an own chapter in the AktG.
221
 However, Germany entered the discussions about corporate 
governance decades after they first arose in the US. 
Traditionally, corporate governance was governed by laws in most jurisdictions. In the 
course of time, laws became inflexible due to their long process of developing and being passed, 
wherefore the role of self-regulation grew.
222
 Against this background, corporate governance of 
other forms, such as soft law or other expressions have gained ground. The idea of this is to not 
corset companies into inflexible structures and enable to react flexibly to the market develop-
ments.
223
 Germany, like many other countries adopted a code and thereby followed the example 
of the United Kingdom.
224
  
In the light of German law-making, this process was far from evident. Historically, Ger-
many is known for it’s traditional and rather complex legal system.
225
 As a country with a code-
based jurisdiction
226
, the largest parts of law were ruled in extensive codifications, for more than 
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a century, that were passed more than 100 years ago. New laws must have been enacted by the 
German Bundestag and had to pass lengthy processes until coming into force.
227
 However, with 
the international forces, the market, the globalization and internationalization,
228
 the process of 
deregulation inserted and the role of national laws is slowly decreasing. 
The DCGK, as most other corporate governance codes, contains mostly recommendations 
as to how to ensure good corporate governance directed to noted companies. The code itself does 
not have any legal force, however, legal force is indirectly attained by section 161 of the AktG. 
The “comply or explain” principle of section 161 AktG is the obligation of noted companies to 
add a declaration of conformity related to the DCGK in their annual report, naming those rec-
ommendations that were not followed.
229
 The idea is to link the code to a legally binding provi-
sion and thereby forcing reactions regarding the companies.  
In Germany, a country of a long tradition and history concerning codifications, critics 
were loud, since the code was established by a non-parliamentary body and the criticism went 
against the idea of “recommendations”.
230
 In the light of constitutional law the justification of 
binding forces which were made by informal or private bodies of law, instead of the known legis-
lative process was rather complex.
 231
 Until now German constitutional lawyer claim that the rec-
ommendations are on some level forcing companies without no parliamentary background, which 
cannot hold in the light of democracy and parliamentary legislature.
232
 These criticism is true: 
adherence of the company is high and the companies might react out of the fear to be punished by 
the market, since the adherence with the code is an important information for foreign investors 
and influences in the decision of investing in those companies. However, this regulation mecha-
nism
233
 proved.  
However, the German approach of law-making still shows influences of its code-based 
mentality. It appears that the government tends to turn soft law into binding law if the recom-
mendations or suggestions were not sufficiently followed. The German Management Compensa-
tion Disclosure Act (Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung, hereafter referred to 
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as “VorstOG”)
234
 serves as an example for this. Firstly, the idea that individualized compensation 
figures should be disclosed, was made in the form of a mere suggestion in the DCGK.
235
 15 
months later the DCGK in its version of 2003 changed the same idea to a recommendation, 
meaning that, boards must follow the “comply or explain” principle and were thereby set under 
more pressure due to an actual obligation to comply
236
. Since the government was of the opinion 
that even the recommendations did not lead to the expected extent of transparency and disclosure 
it turned the idea into binding law with the VorstOG.
237
 
3. The shareholder approach in the context of US law principles 
In the U.S., from my aspect, there are three major factors which formed corporate govern-
ance to the way it is. They are shareholders primacy regime, dispersed share ownership, and 
mandatory disclosure regime. Although, these factors play a significant role in shaping the U.S. 
corporate governance but they also cause dilemma through times. There are a lot of issues follow 
these factors which by the way can both consider as a good archetype for other countries and as a 
unique obstacle for the U.S. socioeconomic. We are going to take a closer look on them. 
a) Shareholders Primacy Regime 
It is a norm in the U.S. corporate law that the goal of corporation is to maximize share-
holder wealth. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.
238
 We can call this a dominance of a 
shareholder-centered ideology. The foundation of the shareholder primacy norm is found in the 
directors’ fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders.
239
 In 
addition, it is also strengthened by the business judgment rule. Regardless of how stupid, egre-
gious or irrational a board decision may be that destroys, rather than maximizes, shareholder 
wealth, it provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the pro-
cess employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate inter-
ests.
240
 In particular, it is hard to say that the U.S. corporate law tends to increase social welfare 
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and asserting that this means furthering the interests of shareholders.
241
 According to the U.S. 
corporate law, corporation, especially public corporation, is solely privilege shareholder interests 
over those of other constituencies such as creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, or even the 
interests of the society as a whole. This is not because we believe that shareholder ownership of 
corporations is an indisputable and sacred property right. Rather, it is because of three reasons.
242
 
First, the firm’s residual claimants cannot be adequately protected by contract. Then, to protect 
their interests, they must be given the right to control the firm. Second, if the control rights grant-
ed to the firm’s equity holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives to 
maximize the value of the firm. And a third reason is that the interests of participants in the firm 
other than shareholders can generally be adequately protected by contract and regulation, so that 
maximization of the firm’s value by its shareholders complements the interests of those other 
participants rather than competing with them. The shareholder-oriented model does more than 
assert the primacy of shareholder interests, however. It asserts the interests of all shareholders, 
including minority shareholders. More importantly, it is a central tenet in the standard model that 
minority or non-controlling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the 
hands of controlling shareholders.
243
 In publicly-traded firms, this means that all shareholders 
should be assured an essentially equal claim on corporate earnings and assets. 
The objective of maximizing shareholder welfare runs deeply through the relevant statuto-
ry and case law that it is rarely questioned, except when the conflict between the interests of 
shareholders and those of other corporate constituencies grows too acute. In general, there are 
three principal sources of conflicts in corporation which are conflict between agents and share-
holders, conflict among shareholders, and conflict between shareholders and the corporation’s 
other constituencies, for instance, creditors, employees. Among a large number of cases in the 
U.S., the most mentioned conflict is the conflict between agents and shareholders which can be 
characterized as the ‘agency problems’.
244
 It is totally clear to mention that the corporate govern-
ance regime in the U.S. is mostly based on the relationship between shareholders and the board of 
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directors since directors tend to alter the way the shareholder primacy primarily should be by turn 
the benefit more for themselves. It can be concluded that the core idea of the U.S. corporate gov-
ernance is to balance the shareholders’ primacy with the board of director’s discretion on using 
business judgement. Besides, once shareholder welfare is identified as the principal objective of 
corporate law and there are only two main ways that shareholders can profit from a corporation: 
by receiving distributions of the company’s profits and by selling all or part of their interest in the 
corporation. It follows easily that economic efficiency is the logical criterion for evaluating cor-
porate law. Any factor that increases residual value of the firm to its shareholders is efficient by 
the criterion.
245
 
The U.S. corporate governance has also developed various tools, for instance, the em-
ployee stock option plan (ESOP) and the stock option for firm’s directors, for distributing the 
benefits of firm’s growth to the workforce and executive. This affirms that the U.S. model also 
care of stakeholders but instead of paying money or offering benefits directly, we turn them to 
shareholders which will add more incentive to improved productivity and increased profits for the 
corporation. At the end this will help build a better society.   
In my opinion, the U.S. system is flexible, as managers with broad discretion may more 
easily respond to changed external circumstances. After balancing the outcome with shareholders 
primacy, this can make corporation’s growth rapidly increases. On the other hand, managerial 
insulation may be the cause of the system’s instability and the recurrence of large scandals in 
another way apart from shareholders’ interest.
246
 The absence of shareholder influence on these 
problems implies that the conflict with stakeholders are relatively insignificant from the view of 
the U.S. corporate governance. 
b) Dispersed Share Ownership 
The nature and number of corporate shareholders surely leave a mark on the structure of 
corporate law. In the U.S., there are large numbers of publicly-traded corporations that have dis-
persed share ownership, such that no single shareholder, or affiliated group of shareholders, is 
capable of exercising control over the firm. Though, the evolution of capital market drives inno-
vation in corporate governance forward, so focusing solely between the relationship of dispersed 
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shareholders and directors of large public firms might become obsolete. Since the supervisory 
role on the executives has shifted to an institutional investor.
247
 As a result, now the ownership 
and control of corporation are separated as old-day shareholders have turned to be just beneficial 
owners for receiving only benefits, for instance, dividend and other interests, and institutional 
investors, as a record owner, play an important role of representing beneficial owner and moni-
toring corporate’s executives. This shift of equity ownership from a widely distributed ownership 
to concentrated institutional ownership gave rise to “agency capitalism” era, as approximately 
owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.
248
 In 
the light of the aforesaid situation, it can vividly state that the “agency capitalism”, which in turn 
leads to the problem of separation of ownership from control, has a major impact on modern cor-
porate governance in the U.S. 
As an aftermath, institution investors should play a significant role as the shareholder ac-
tivists but the only concern is the passivity role of them. In other words, institution investors very 
rarely get involve with the matter on corporate governance of their stock-holding corporations. 
Institution investors, consist of mutual fund and pension fund, do not run a role of shareholder 
activists willingly for reasons, for instance, the cost of agency, the worthiness of benefit to over-
all portfolio, the lacking of experience or internal mechanism, the lacking of incentive for fund 
managers, and last but not least, the need of focusing on macro view than micro view.
249
  On the 
other hand, hedge fund and proxy advisory firm can act as an activist shareholders by working 
hand–in-hand with pension fund and mutual fund. Since they are not pursuit of private benefits of 
control, specialize in monitoring companies to identify strategic opportunities and can then per-
suade their enthusiastic solution to pension fund and mutual fund for their approval.
250
 In return, 
the activist can be compensate by the quality of their work. This process can bring balance be-
tween large firms’ executives and beneficial owners, though, this model seems to be more practi-
cal than the old-day which minority shareholders needed to gather their votes together, because 
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institution investors already held a majority sum of large firm shares. But institution investors 
must be free of conflict of interest and be professional in proxy voting services.
251
 
In my opinion, despite the fact that nowadays institutional investors play a crucial role in 
the U.S. corporate governance system, but they still act as only a record holder for individual 
investors. In other words, the dispersed share ownership structure in the U.S. still remains. So in 
the end, the beneficiary shareholders behind those institutional investors still exists but their right 
tends to be more efficiently protected by the activist institutions. As a result, in substance, public 
firms in the U.S. are not belong to specific group of people, but instead indirectly held for benefit 
by dispersed group of people. Then we may summarize that because of our disperse shareholder 
structure, we do not need to care for stakeholder’s value that much as shareholders in the U.S. 
can well represent stakeholders in the society.  
c) Mandatory disclosure regime 
The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation has been 
the subject of a longstanding debate in the field of corporate governance in the U.S. The debate 
has largely focused on the desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in the U.S., a coun-
try characterized by dispersed ownership structures. This requirement aims to protect investors by 
creating equality among them. The presence of a demanding disclosure regime would have the 
socially desirable effect of increasing competition in the capital and product markets and also 
providing investors information which directly relate to their decision to buy or sell securities.
252
 
Disclosure obligations are imposed on the issuer, a nonparty to the transaction, to protect the par-
ties’ investment decisions. The duties owed in that setting are not unlike traditional corporate law 
duties, albeit usually imposed on the directors rather than the corporation to protect other share-
holder decisions. It is undeniable that the mandatory disclosure regime is the core of securities 
regulation in the U.S. and can be stated that it is a core policy for securities regulation all over the 
world. On the other hand, the duty to disclose firms’ information also be a great cost for firms as 
well so one of the most important agenda for the policy maker and/or regulator is to balance the 
mandatory disclosure regime by caring on both the investors’ benefit and the firm’s management 
and operation cost. 
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This disclosure regime at first glance seems market-based, rather than governance-based. 
Such a market/governance distinction has been attractive to some who advocated federal preemp-
tion of the regulation of market transactions. Yet, any clear division between corporate govern-
ance and regulation of market transactions has blurred to such an extent that the line seems diffi-
cult to preserve. Modern financial theory recognizes the direct link between market rules and 
governance rules, in which the existence of market constraints can reduce the need for legal rules 
of governance. One of the most obvious example in the U.S. is the rise of the reporting on the 
presence of conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in their supply 
chains. Beginning May 31, 2014, publicly traded companies will be required to declare to the 
SEC whether or not their products or components contain tin, tungsten, tantalum or gold which 
can be abbreviated as “3TG” materials, since this issue relates to human rights abuses in the 
DRC. Many businesses have been dragging their feet on preparations for complying. Many have 
yet to create a reporting structure with their suppliers, contract manufacturers and other supply-
chain partners because minerals covered by the rule are found in countless consumer goods, in-
cluding electronics products, automobiles, packaging and medical devices. Given that the average 
public company works with between 2,000 and 10,000 first-tier suppliers, and many thousands 
more further up the supply chain, the task of tracing product content all the way back to the mine 
is a daunting one.
253
 As a result, the cost of compliance promises to be huge. 
In my opinion, the conflict-minerals rule probably won’t be the last time that regulators 
seek control over the human-rights policies of global business. It could conceivably be extended 
to other parts of the world, or additional raw materials. Then we need to rethink about the policy 
behind the mandatory disclosure regime in the U.S. The question is, the U.S. is going to expand 
types of information that firms need to disclosure to the public. In other words, the role of the 
disclosure regime in the U.S. is going to be broader. We are about to cross the line of the goal of 
protecting shareholders right for investing to the new area of international agendas. On the other 
hand, the cost of disclosure still be an important issue to consider about. By the way, this demon-
strates that the border of the mandatory disclosure regime is gradually getting broader and broad-
er. 
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4. The stakeholder approach 
Germany, as most European countries, follows the stakeholder approach. According to 
the stakeholder approach, the focus of corporate governance is not only the maximization of 
shareholder wealth, but broader, involving also the interest of other groups of stakeholders.
254
 By 
common understanding stakeholders can be of all groups of natural persons and institutions that 
transact with the company and have economic interest as to what happens in the company, such 
as customers, creditors or suppliers.
255
 Main interest for the stakeholder is the compensation of 
contributions made for the company. Employees are stakeholders as well. If a company promises 
a new workplace in another city and the employee in reliance upon this information moves to that 
other city only to be told that the company cannot hire due to economic struggles, the employee 
is directly affected by the happening of that company.
256
 
Employees, however, enjoy a special role in German corporate law. As in many other Eu-
ropean countries there is mandatory labor codetermination. Whereas in most other states labor 
usually represents a third of board membership, German corporate law mandates shareholder and 
labor membership at parity on the supervisory board. Against this background, Labor codetermi-
nation might be one of the most intense expressions of the stakeholder approach in corporate 
governance. 
In the U.S., the idea of “stakeholder theory” starts with “corporate philanthropy”
257
 which 
is the act of a corporation or business promoting the welfare of others, generally via charitable 
donations of fund, product, service or time. The best example is the Microsoft Corporation
258
 
donates a lot of software to nonprofits around the world. Then the idea developed to “corporate 
social responsibility” (CSR)
259
 in a form of corporate self-regulation integrated into a business 
model. CSR policy functions as a self-regulatory mechanism whereby a business monitors and 
ensures its active compliance with the spirit of the law, ethical standards and national or interna-
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tional norms. U.S. businesses freely acknowledge their ethical and social obligations. They ac-
cept the idea that businesses bear economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities. Af-
ter that, the U.S. has developed the concept of “stakeholder theory” further to “benefit corpora-
tion” (B-Corp). In the U.S., B-Corp is a type of for-profit corporate entity, authorized by more 
than half of all states in the U.S. that includes positive impact on society and the environment in 
addition to profit as its legally defined goals. B-Corp differ from traditional corporations only in 
purpose, accountability, and transparency, but not in taxation and board of directors’ fiduciary 
duty. To be a B-Corp, the charter of incorporation must contain the charter provision that comply 
with the purpose of B-Corp. On August 2013, Delaware’s new benefit corporation law came into 
effect, making Delaware the 19th state to authorize the formation of benefit corporations. B-Corp 
a special type of corporation that requires directors to consider the advancement of certain speci-
fied public benefits when making management decisions for the company.
260
 Delaware’s adop-
tion of the B-Corp model is significant, because Delaware has historically been a leader in Amer-
ican corporate law. The purpose of a benefit corporation includes creating general public benefit, 
which is defined as a material positive impact on society and the environment. A benefit corpora-
tion’s directors and officers operate the business with the same authority as in a traditional corpo-
ration but are required to consider the impact of their decisions not only on shareholders but also 
on society and the environment. Transparency provisions require B-Corp to publish annual bene-
fit reports of their social and environmental performance using a comprehensive, credible, inde-
pendent, and transparent third-party standard.
261
 The major concern in the U.S. is on the difficulty 
of raising capital of the B-Corp because of charitable function. This in turn might disincentives 
profit- making institution investors from investing but will work for long-term investors. 
II. Harmonization 
1. On a global level 
Since the mid-twentieth century, global rule making has been increasingly the province of 
“international organization”. Institutions defined by academics as grounded in a formal ratified 
treaty and enjoying “state membership, tangible manifestations of organizational bureaucracy, 
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and an adequate legal pedigree.”
262
 By contrast, in the international financial system, the produc-
tion of international standards and rules arises through largely information institutional arrange-
ments grounded in nonbinding bylaws, charters, and accords which, as such, aren’t recognized 
under international law
263
 and they can be introduced as “soft law”. These soft law have been set 
by the group of “G-20” which contains both the U.S. and Germany. Although, the commitments 
made by international financial organizations have no legal effect and are unrecognized and non-
binding as a matter of international law, but they can still be enforced in international forum. 
Since international financial rules and standards are adopted robustly across borders, regulators 
are better able to ensure adequate cross-border supervision of market participants, no matter 
where they operate. Opportunities for arbitrage and regulatory competition are dramatically re-
duced, and enforcement cooperation and information sharing among jurisdictions is enhanced.
264
 
These are the incentive of complying with soft law. On the other hand, if a regulator deems cer-
tain rules disadvantageous to its domestic markets, it may fail to honor its commitments. Since 
the international financial regulation, though formally a species of “soft law,” is bolstered by var-
ious disciplining mechanisms that render it, under circumstances, more coercive than traditional 
theories of international law predict. For instance, the loss of reputation and ability to create coa-
litions and alliances in the future, the cost of capital for firms operating in noncompliant jurisdic-
tions will increase and also be banned from international fund raising transaction as well.
265
 
Soft law instruments can be grouped into three broad categories
266
: 
(1) Best practices: International financial law often takes the form of best practices to 
promote sound regulatory provisions. They tend to define the minimum shared standards neces-
sary for a good financial regulatory system.  
(2) Regulatory reports and observations: They are acknowledged as the data collected, as-
sessed, and utilized by national and international regulators to craft policy. They are another im-
portant source of international financial law. Reports create an official record of fact and help 
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establish a basis for policymaking and often generate normative undercurrents that help define 
the appropriateness of different regulatory responses.  Furthermore, help establish tacit commit-
ments by national authorities 
(3) Information sharing and enforcement cooperation: Many international financial 
agreements spell out procedural means by which greater information sharing and enforcement 
cooperation can be achieved. Information-sharing agreements are usually promulgated through 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) and address the reality that many domestic financial insti-
tutions are globally active. They help coordination with other international regulators. Moreover, 
enforcement agreements, detail the terms by which different countries agree to provide assistance 
to one another for enforcing domestic or international rules. 
In the field of corporate governance, there are two major organizations which set an inter-
national standard for corporate governance. They are Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) and International Organization for Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
To begin with, OECD
267
 has three main aims; first to promote policies designed to 
achieve sustainable economic growth in member countries while maintaining financial stability; 
contribute to sound economic expansion in member/non-member countries in process of econom-
ic development; and to contribute to the expansion of world trade. The main role of OECD is to 
develop standards and guidelines for countries to devise or retain effective corporate governance 
frameworks. This has formed the basis of the corporate governance component of the world. 
Though, membership stands at only 31 countries but has informal relationships with 71 non-
members.  Despite exclusive membership requirements, defines itself as a forum for governments 
to compare policies, seek answers to common problems, and identify good practices. 
Second, IOSCO
268
 has duty as a standard setter for securities regulation. From historical 
view, it is tied to the rapid internationalization growth of securities markets. Its membership ex-
panded to include not only the U.S. but also many countries around the world. It adopted a more 
aggressive means of facilitating enforcement cooperation through its multilateral memorandum 
of understanding (MMOU), an agreement memorializing a process whereby regulators can ask 
assistance from their foreign counterparts to help prosecute cases in which witnesses or the pro-
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ceeds of fraud are located in other jurisdictions. In exchange of that they need to follow the 
standard that IOSCO has set and one of the most important standard is the standard for disclosure 
of information of the publicly traded corporation. 
2. On EU level 
Europe is a continent with rich, various and different traditions in all its member states. In 
terms of the prevailing law, the economic, social and cultural aspects and conditions lead to path-
dependent developments in different directions.
269
 However, with the establishment of the Euro-
pean Union in 1993, the focus was laid on creating a single European airspace and guarantee the 
fundamental freedoms. A united European Union aimed on a European community in order to 
become stronger and to be able to face big competitors east of Germany as well as overseas.  Fur-
thermore, the market itself contributed to national legislators to internationally compare and ana-
lyze their national system in order to find weak points and eliminate them.
270
 The need for har-
monization, therefore, is a result of many independently acting forces, such as the market and the 
intent to stay competitive as well as the idea behind the European Union. 
In regard to corporate law, the European legislator planned to create uniform and harmo-
nized conditions and options for entrepreneurs in conformity with the EU domestic market.
271
 For 
this, the European legislator has different instruments. 
a) Approximation of national corporate laws 
Directives are the main force for the approximation of the national corporate laws and are di-
rected to the national legislators. They are based on article 50 II g) of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, hereafter 
referred to as “AEUV”). Directives, however, are not directly legally binding but attain norma-
tive force after being transferred by the national laws of each country. 
An example for this was the council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 directing 
legislators of all member states to create rules to implement the SE into their national law. Ger-
many did so by passing the European Company Implementation Act.
272
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b) New supranational legal forms 
In the same context, harmonization is encouraged by the creation of new legal forms on a 
supranational level. The SE is the most known supranational legal form in corporate law. Supra-
national legal forms such as the SE step beside national options of corporations and provide 
companies another choice, encouraged by the EU. Being ruled entirely by the law of the Europe-
an Union choosing this legal form promises maximal legal certainty and attains attractiveness 
thereby. Moreover, the SE offers a simplified possibility to act transnational and furthermore 
promotes transnational mergers of companies from the member states.  
c) Control by the EuGH  
The decisions of the EuGH regarding the freedom of establishment have shown the scope 
of power, that the EuGH has with its ruling. With overruling existing schools of thoughts, as it 
did by deciding against the seat-theory, it can change the legal direction of all member states, 
obliging them to follow. In its decisions the EuGH explicitly accepts companies to take ad-
vantage of other member states’ more preferable corporate laws, thereby promoting flexibility 
among companies in the member states. Against the background of harmonization, the EuGH 
plays an important role by diffusing and standardizing across national borders.
 273
 
III. Conclusion 
Corporate Governance is an issue that was first raised in the U.S. Only decades later it ar-
rived Europa via the United Kingdom and reached Germany.
274
 International competition forced 
the European counties to catch up in order to compete. In this context, the predominant jurisdic-
tions are experiencing a “regulatory competition”
275
 to convince and attract investors and compa-
nies. However, approaches are different. Responsible for this are the differences in the back-
ground of both jurisdiction being economical, historical and political differences. 
Disparities grew since both countries approached opposing theories. The U.S. strongly be-
lieve in the shareholders primacy regime but Germany chose to follow the path of stakeholder 
benefit. However, at present, it seems that either the U.S. or Germany views’ on corporate gov-
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ernance tend to be in harmony with each other. There are many evidences affirmed this assump-
tion as we both have illustrated in this part of this report. This might be the dawn of the stake-
holder welfare’s protection, instead of shareholder’s benefit maximization. Furthermore, we are 
confident that in the near future the harmonization will be seen much clearer because of the im-
pact of the business globalization. To be more precise, the unification of nations and the drive of 
international trade and investment will make corporation law’s structure resemble.  
Although the trend follows the idea of harmonization, one should not forget, that devel-
opments in terms of corporate governance are deeply linked to the crises and driven by corporate 
scandals of the individual jurisdiction.
276
 These problems, however, are not necessarily identical 
across borders. For this reason, corporate governance solutions of other countries not be simply 
copied and implemented into another jurisdiction of another background with the same suc-
cess.
277
 
Furthermore, the rise of soft law era will play a major role for harmonization of financial 
regulation in every jurisdiction. As a result, corporate and financial lawyers around the world 
need to adjust their legal thought on this change and be ready for the upcoming wave of globali-
zation. 
Summing up, the trend goes to the opening of both jurisdictions towards each other.
 278
 
Despite the convergence, however, substantial differences prevail, which were products of the 
individual development of the country and its history.
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